

THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE:
A COMMAND AND CONTROL ALTERNATIVE FOR
CONDUCTING PEACE OPERATIONS

A Thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE


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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1995

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19950927 126

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 2 June 1995		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis, 2 Aug 94 - 2 Jun 95
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The United Nations Military Staff Committee: A Command and Control Alternative for Conducting Peace Operations			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Captain (P) John Scott Alexander, Jr., U.S. Army				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
				
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This study examines the deficiencies within the current UN organization for military command and control and their adverse effects on guidance and planning support for commanders conducting peace operations. The thesis proposes structural changes designed to make the system more effective. Specifically, empowering the Military Staff Committee to realize its responsibilities outlined in the UN Charter; while relieving the Secretariat and the Secretary General from performing duties which they are neither designed for, nor capable of. The study begins with a description of the current UN system for conducting peace operations. It examines the history and Charter of the UN in terms of the international political realities at the end of World War II, contrasted against the political realities facing the World in a post-cold war era. Peace operations are commonly multinational efforts. This study considers the collective joint/combined experience of the Permanent Members of the Security Council and suggests that the United Nations could conduct peace operations more effectively if the structure was changed to be consistent with the UN Charter.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Peace Operations, United Nations, Command and Control			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 79	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unlimited	

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE


Name of Candidate: CPT (P) John Scott Alexander, Jr.

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Conducting Peace Operations.

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

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ABSTRACT

THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE: A COMMAND AND CONTROL ALTERNATIVE FOR CONDUCTING PEACE OPERATIONS by
CPT (P) John Scott Alexander, Jr., USA, 75 pages.

This study examines the deficiencies within the current UN organization for military command and control and their adverse effects on guidance and planning support for commanders conducting peace operations.

The thesis proposes structural changes designed to make the system more effective. Specifically, empowering the Military Staff Committee to realize its responsibilities outlined in the UN Charter; while relieving the Secretariat and the Secretary General from performing duties which they are neither designed for, nor capable of.

The study begins with a description of the current UN system for conducting peace operations. It examines the history and Charter of the UN in terms of the international political realities at the end of World War II, contrasted against the political realities facing the world in a post-cold war era.

Peace operations are commonly multinational efforts. This study considers the collective joint/combined experience of the Permanent Members of the Security Council and suggests that the United Nations could conduct peace operations more effectively if the structure was changed to be consistent with the UN Charter.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project is dedicated to Maria and John-John, my wife and son. There is little I do in this profession that doesn't require a sacrifice on their part. Thank-you for your love and support.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The former commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Sarajevo made the following comment concerning United Nations shortcomings in February 1995:

They need a headquarters. They need a functioning headquarters capable of commanding and controlling, doing contingency planning, logistics support, etc. . . . However, where I differ with what's happening now; it should not be in the Secretariat. It should not report to the Secretary-General. It should report to the Security Council.

Major General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie

Problem Statement

The United Nation's command and control capabilities for conducting peace operations need substantial improvement.¹ The basic structure to conduct UN Peace Operations, "exists in the specific branches of the UN Secretariat that have standing responsibilities for contingency planning and management."² This system is a product of Cold War gridlock within the Security Council. It lacks the capacity to provide clear political and military objectives for force commanders. It also fails to provide adequate operational planning support, efficient logistical support, or the ability to react in a timely manner to regional contingencies. This investigation will concentrate on two issues: (1) Shortcomings within the current UN organization

for military command and control which adversely effect guidance and planning support for peace operations and (2) Structural changes designed to make the system more effective.

Specifically, empowering the Military Staff Committee to realize its responsibilities outlined in the UN Charter while relieving the Secretariat and the Secretary General from performing duties for which it is neither designed for nor capable of.

The Current Organization

Force Commanders

Mandates, in the form of Security Council resolutions, provide the international legal authority for conducting peace operations. They empower the Secretary-General to request forces from contributing Members of the UN. Once a basic force is established, a force commander is selected. This is the person charged with applying military forces pursuant to a Security Council resolution. Thus, the selection of force commanders is an important step in establishing a new mission.

Force commanders are selected by the UN Secretary-General and unanimously approved by the Security Council. The commander will usually come from one of the major force contributors. Other factors such as impartiality, equitable geographical representation by UN member nations, and the perceived ability of the commander to form consensus between the conflicting parties are taken into account.

The Force Commander is subordinate to a political chief of mission (usually a Special Representative of the Secretary

General (SRSG)) who in turn will report directly to the Secretary-General or indirectly through an undersecretary. The Secretary-General reports directly to the President of the Security Council who in turn informs the members of the Security Council regarding the implementation of the mandate. To complicate the matter, national forces contributing to the operation each have an internal chain of command directly to their national authorities. As a result, the UN operational chain of command is occasionally bypassed. National authorities will refer directly to diplomatic missions rather than UN force commanders.

This chain of command illustrates the "ad hoc" nature of the current system. The question of, "Who's in charge?" can become complicated, especially in a system that lacks any type of statutory articulation of responsibility, doctrine, or standard operating procedures.

Operational Planning

Operational planning and support are provided by The Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) which is headed by an Undersecretary General, who reports directly to the Secretary General. At present, each UN operation is created and managed separately by this somewhat understaffed UN Department.³ It presently handles a number of ongoing missions resulting from international interventions in conflicts all over the world. Until recently, the Military Staff within the office (which is responsible for the military aspects of all existing peacekeeping

and observer missions) had only four officials.⁴ It has now been expanded to over one hundred and is still undermanned. Moreover, the capability of the staff to efficiently plan missions in an environment dominated by diplomats has resulted in a number of questionable results.

Logistics

All administrative matters, including logistics and provisions, are handled by the Field Operations Division (FOD) which reports to the Undersecretary General for Administration and Management. Currently the FOD has only 33 professionals and 83 general service staff in the Headquarters in New York to support all UN overseas offices and operations. "It specializes, as one FOD official noted, in starting a mission with 'no notice, no money, and no stockpile.'"⁵

Currently the UN does not have an established, formal supply system as we know it in the U.S. Army. The UN system is based entirely on procurement of supplies for support. There is no formal budget established, no GS/DS base, few stocks on hand within the system from which to draw essential supplies.⁶

Consequently, sustainment issues have resulted in innumerable problems for military forces serving on UN operations.

Contingency Response

According to MG MacKenzie, "The UN, regretfully, cannot and does not work at the speed of light."⁷ In fact it took six months between the time that a decision was made in the Security Council to send a force into Bosnia and the time that the military planning staff began to prepare a plan.

It is extremely difficult, given the current methods for implementing Security Council mandates, for the UN to react in a timely manner. The absence of a dedicated stand-by force, capable of rapid response to contingency operations, highlights the need for a standing headquarters capable of providing prior planning and coordination for participating forces. Currently, from the time that a contingency or conflict arises requiring United Nations attention; to the time that a mandate is received by the Secretary-General; to the time that a force is selected; to the time that planning begins; and finally, to the time that the force is fielded, many months can pass. The UN cannot handle demanding milestones rapidly whether they are political, operational, or logistical.⁸ The current system, with its disjointed chain of command, planning, and support structure, cannot facilitate the unity of effort required to respond to contingency crises.

Research Question

Can expanding the role of the Military Staff Committee (MSC) improve the command and control capabilities of the United Nations for conducting peace operations?

Background

At the end of World War II proposals for organizing a new postwar world organization gained momentum. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Georgetown, Washington D.C., representatives from China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States drafted "Proposals for the Establishment of a General

International Organization." This would later become the framework for a draft UN Charter produced at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. The most important aspect of the draft as it relates to this study is found in Chapter VIII, *"Arrangements for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, Including Prevention and Suppression for Aggression."*⁹ It is here that the Allied Powers of the Second World War resolved not to repeat some of the mistakes of the past.

"At its founding one of the UN's most publicized advantages over its predecessor, the League of Nations, was the fact that it was a peace organization 'with teeth.'"¹⁰ Chapter VI, *Pacific Settlement of Disputes*, and Chapter VII, *Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression*, anticipate the utilization of military forces in an almost "Clausewitzian" fashion. That is, to view military force as an extension of diplomacy. (Points which will be more thoroughly developed in later chapters.) It is to this end that the Military Staff Committee was established. Article 47 (Chapter VII) establishes the composition and responsibilities for this committee:

(1) There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

(2) The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the

efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of the Member in its work.

(3) The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

(4) The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

The original framers of the UN Charter envisaged a system for securing, maintaining, and enforcing peace that is wholly different from what is being practiced today.

At its inception, the United Nations was conceived as, above all, a collective security organ. The idea was that if one state attacked another, the whole world community, acting through the Security Council, would come to the defense of the victim country. . . . Article 43 of the UN Charter sets out a mechanism to enforce the decisions (of the Security Council) by having members dedicate armed forces for use at the direction of the Security Council.

In 1945 when the UN Charter was drafted, no one envisaged a need for other collective security arrangements. At that time we were all full of hope, full of ambitions and ideas of a new world, a world governed by law where peace reigned.

The Cold War, however, rendered impossible a meaningful United Nations collective security role. . . ."¹¹

This investigation will not address the arguments for dedicating stand-by forces in support of the collective security arrangements called for in Article 43. However, it will consider the nature of the command and control aspects that are implied in that Article. Article 47 establishes the staff responsibilities of the MSC in terms of advice, assistance, employment, and command of those forces. Despite the absence of dedicated forces, the potential for utilizing the potential expertise of the MSC remains unchanged.

The end of the Cold War has presented a new diplomatic condition within the UN and more importantly within the Security Council. The institutional pressures created previously have given way to a new east-west reapproachment. Multilateral agreement amongst the permanent members of the Security Council has replaced the antagonism that stagnated the organization from its inception in 1947. For this reason, I believe that the current role of the Military Staff Committee can be expanded to fulfill the role for which it was intended. I believe this will enhance the United Nation's capabilities for planning, operations, and logistics. More importantly it can substantially improve the command and control for conducting peace operations by streamlining the chain of command and facilitating the definition of clear military strategy.

Definitions

The following definitions are provided to clearly define the context in which they will be used throughout this study:

Command and Control. Command is the primary means whereby the vision is imparted to the organization. The result of effective command is the direction which helps produce results. Control is a process used to establish limits and provide structure to this direction. Its purpose is to deal with the uncertainties inherent in organizational operations.¹²

Information. The United Nations perceives the term "intelligence" to be hostile. In the interest of maintaining impartiality, the UN prefers to use the term "information".

Information is meant to include intelligence throughout this paper.

Peace Enforcement. Military intervention to forcefully restore peace between belligerents, who may be engaged in combat.¹³

Peacekeeping. Operations using military forces and/or civilian personnel at the request of the parties to a dispute to help supervise a cease-fire agreement and/or separate the parties.¹⁴

Peace Operations. For simplicity, the term peace operations is used in this document to mean the entire spectrum of activities from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement aimed at defusing and resolving international conflicts.¹⁵

Significance of the Problem

Currently there are numerous peace operations being conducted worldwide by the United Nations. In virtually all instances there are some U.S. military or civilian personnel directly involved in these operations. The United States National Command Authority (NCA) has stipulated that it will never relinquish command authority over U.S. troops. However, once committed under UN control, the UN peacekeeping organization exerts an overwhelming influence over the conduct of operations by U.S. personnel and units. This is particularly evident at the strategic and operational level, and to some degree, at the tactical level. Therefore, the ability and capacity of the UN to prudently, safely, and efficiently apply military force in

support of UN resolutions is a major concern for the United States and all nations which commit troops in support of UN operations.

Interest in the Problem

The extent of U.S. national interest in this problem is evident in President Clinton's National Security Strategy (NSS).

. . . We must recognize that peace operations make demands on the UN that exceed the organization's current capabilities. The United States is working with the UN headquarters and other member states to ensure that the UN embarks only on peace operations that make political and military sense and that the UN is able to manage effectively those peace operations it does undertake. We support the creation of a professional UN peace operations headquarters with a planning staff, access to timely intelligence, a logistics unit that can be rapidly deployed and a modern operations center with global communications.¹⁶

In addition, President Clinton signed a Presidential Decision Directive in May of 1993. It established a "U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations" that the NSS describes as the first comprehensive framework for U.S. decisionmaking, regarding peace operations, in the post-Cold War era.

Given the importance of the subject at the U.S. National Command Authority (NCA) level, it is logically an important topic in the U.S. Department of Defense. Particularly since recent operations in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti have involved large numbers of U.S. combat units. By some accounts, particularly the current U.S. administration, the future will require a greater level of involvement on the part of the U.S. in

UN operations. As a result, the problem will continue to be of interest, at least to the U.S. Military.

Research Design

The structure of this study will be designed to support the following thesis: expanding the current role of the Military Staff Committee to meet its obligations outlined in the UN Charter, and eliminating the current mission management structure as it exists in the Secretariat, will enhance the United Nation's command and control capabilities.

This investigation will concentrate on two underlying questions in support of the thesis. The first will examine the problems of the current system in terms of command and control. The second will focus on improvements that can be made by structurally changing the current system to one proposed by the thesis. Each of these questions will require a further examination of several supporting questions described in chapters 3 and 4.

Chapter 2 will review the literature devoted to United Nations command and control of peace operations as it pertains to the thesis. There is ample evidence indicating that something is wrong with the current system. Yet there is little agreement on what can be done to fix it. This chapter will analyze the current literature and establish a foundation for the validity of evidence presented in succeeding chapters.

Chapter 3 will be devoted to the problems of the current system. It will examine in detail the system as it was designed

and the evolution it has undergone to arrive at its current structure. It will dissect the term command and control in order to view both the organization (as a system for conducting peace operations) and its command structure (establishing responsibility and delegating authority).

The examination of control aspects of the current structure will focus on its capacity for planning and sustaining a peace operation. This will include the current methods for providing strategic direction, managing information, providing logistical planning support, and facilitating communications between the policy makers and the forces executing the policy. All of these are basic support functions required of a strategic/operational level staff.

The examination of the current command aspects of the organization will analyze the chain of command, and how "nested concepts" for achieving desired political and military end states are developed and realized (or not realized) at all levels of command within the organization. This portion of the study will also examine the concept of unity of effort; how it is achieved and how important it is for conducting any type of coalition operation.

The question of what the system was intended to do, and how it evolved to what it is, will rely heavily on official documentation. Analysis of the UN Charter, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the San Francisco Conference, and published accounts of the negotiations which led up to the agreements reached at

those conferences (as they relate to the MSC) will be included as evidence.

Chapter 4 will be devoted to examining the improvements that could be made if the MSC were allowed to assume all the duties and responsibilities assigned to it in the UN Charter. Since this is essential to the thesis, the evidence gathered will be especially important. I will examine the MSC in terms of what it has done to date, and what its potential is (in a post-Cold War environment) given its current composition. I will not attempt to propose an organizational structure for an expanded MSC, but will look at the question as it relates to the potential capabilities of the current members to plan and conduct joint/combined operations.

The examination of what the MSC has done since its initial inception will be limited in that very little is known or published about its activities since 1947. The contention is that the tensions created by the Cold War, especially the confrontational relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, left it virtually dysfunctional. If this assertion is true, then the revitalized diplomatic relations between Russia and the United States (and the absence of Cold War antagonism in the Security Council) will stand as evidence that the MSC can become functional within the framework of the UN Charter.

Chapter 5 will be a synthesis of chapters 3 and 4. It will analyze the evidence presented in these chapters to form supporting conclusions for the thesis. This chapter will address some anticipated objections to changing the current organization.

It will discuss issues of personnel to include a general analysis of the UN Secretariat and how the backgrounds of many of its members make them amateurs at conducting military operations. The chapter will conclude that, given the current system, the United Nations would be served much more effectively in the conduct of peace operations by empowering the Military Staff Committee to fulfill its role as established in the UN Charter.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will review the literature devoted to United Nations command and control of peace operations. It will begin with a review of the existing documentation that supports the premise that the United Nations was originally designed to conduct military operations in a much different manner than it does today. Next it will review literature that supports the premise that the existing system for conducting peace operations needs to be changed. Finally, it will review current literature that supports the premise that a fully functional MSC could be more suitable for conducting the type of joint/combined operations (that characterize most modern military operations) than an organization structured under the Secretariat.

The published documentation of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (21 August to 7 October 1944) is the starting point for determining the initial concept for maintenance of peace at the close of World War II. The results of this conference were a central point of discussion during the Yalta Conference among Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt in February 1945. The message traffic and official correspondence among these three countries leading up to the conference are now declassified and available on microfilm. It lends a very interesting perspective when

contrasted with the results of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, held in San Francisco two months later. (The resultant Charter of the United Nations was signed in June and implemented in October of 1945.) The analysis resulting from these documents is clear. The initial intent was to create a Security Council that could secure and maintain peace and, if necessary, apply military means against aggressors. At no point in any of the documentation is there any mention of the General Assembly or Secretariat assuming the responsibility for performing these functions.

Subsequent documents of Security Council meetings and the meetings of the MSC indicate the initial problems that arose from the emerging Cold War and adversarial relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Documents released by the U.S. National Security Council reflect the situation in the UN Security Council between 1950-1955. The antagonistic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was threatening to doom the UN to a fate not unlike the League of Nations. During this period the United States decided that rather than allow the United Nations to fail, a new approach was required for collective security. The NSC documents clearly articulate a policy decision to pursue arrangements outside of the Security Council which the Soviet Union could not veto. From this decision, the current structure for peace operations has evolved.

There is a great deal of literature ranging from editorial comments in the *New York Times*, by Giandomenico Picco; to

magazine articles like "A Changing World, A Changing UN," by Jan Goldman in *Military Review*; to books like *A World in Need of Leadership: Tomorrow's United Nations*, by Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers that indicate something is wrong with the current system. There are several books and reports that focus on specific UN peacekeeping operations, such as *UNIFIL: International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978-1988*, by Bjorn Skogmo, and *Humanitarian Intervention, Effectiveness of UN Operations in Bosnia*, published by the US GAO. They often go into great detail when describing failures of the UN system as they occurred during particular missions. The most important thing that these sources provide is a history of developing trends. Examples are found in the case studies of recent UN operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Lebanon. Each one of these missions experienced problems including strategic direction, operational focus, logistical coordination, lack of information and communications. NOTE: In order to account for recent changes in the DPKO military staff, this discussion will focus on recent and current operations.

One of the most productive sources of information on UN operations is the testimony of expert witnesses before the Foreign Affairs Committees and Armed Services Committees of Congress. This testimony commonly concerns United States support (usually financial) for continued UN peace operations. Because of the large amount of money that the United States is assessed relative to all other UN Members, these committees are sometimes

very critical in their examination. The staffs that support the committees often publish a detailed background investigation. This thesis utilizes testimony from recent committee hearings that include discussions on: (1) The UN Collective Security System; (2) Peacekeeping, peace-making, and peace-enforcement operations; (3) Review of current peace operations in the field; (4) Operational mandates; (5) Operational components; (6) UN Headquarters; and (7) Policy recommendations. The staff reports also contain a large volume of useful historical background and analysis to support several aspects of this study.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has conducted detailed investigations of peace operations conducted by several countries. These studies tend to be focused on operational and tactical level issues. However, given the trends that have been identified through other works, CALL studies reflect the extent to which the current UN system adversely effects combat units conducting UN operations. This information will be used to support the analysis of the current UN organization for conducting peace operations.

I have not found any published work to date devoted to proving or disproving the thesis. The MSC is often mentioned in the context of "what the system was intended to be." The topic often serves as a basis for defining the greater problems the UN has had conducting peace operations. It is rarely addressed as a potential remedy for the system. I believe this is largely due to the fact that the end of the Cold War is just beginning to be realized and organizations like the UN are slow to adjust. What

was diplomatic reality five years ago has dramatically changed today. Fifty years of Cold War division has just come to an end, and it will take some time for institutions to adjust. Particularly the UN, an institution whose entire life-span is within those fifty years.

The Procedure of the UN Security Council, by Sydney D. Bailey, provides an excellent historical account of the early proceedings of the Military Staff Committee. It is presented in a chronological order beginning in 1946 and continuing through 1988 with all entries documented from the official records of the United Nations. It will serve as a basis for describing what the MSC has done to date. Additionally, The United Nations: How it Works and What it Does, by Evan Luard, provides some excellent analysis of the circumstances which prevented the MSC from becoming a fully functional subsidiary organ of the UNSC. Luard's conclusions are significant in terms of comparing the political situation in 1946 with new political realities in the post Cold War period.

The joint/combined command and control arrangements developed by NATO will be the starting point for examining the potential of the MSC. Three of the permanent five members of the Security Council are represented in NATO. Moreover, these three governments (who were central in bringing the UN into operation in 1947) were essentially the same governments who created the military and political infrastructure of NATO. Although it is a collective security organization with a much smaller scope, many of the political and military organs of NATO are mirror

reflections of the UN; most notably, the composition and charter of the NATO Military Committee and the UN MSC.

There is abundant literature about NATO from a variety of sources. Jane's NATO Handbook 1990-91, edited by Bruce George, and the NATO Handbook, published by the NATO Information Service, provide detailed information and analysis about NATO strategic direction and general staff functions. The Warsaw Pact, by Robin Allison Remington, and Warsaw Pact Forces, Problems of Command and Control, by Jeffrey Simon, provide similar information about the Warsaw Pact. These sources will be used to support the argument that there is a relatively common joint/combined experience for conducting military coalition operations among the nations which constitute the permanent members of the Security Council.

CHAPTER 3

THE CURRENT SYSTEM

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recently wrote, today's peacekeeping involves new situations and new tasks. Peacekeeper's have been sent to areas where there are no agreements, where consent to a UN presence is sporadic and where governments do not exist or have limited effective authority. And peacekeeping is more than just keeping apart warring parties. It may be aimed at protecting vulnerable populations, delivering humanitarian relief or responding to the collapse of a state. It may entail restoring democracy or building a foundation for national recovery. Often these tasks go on at the same time, in the same theater of operations.¹⁷

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, the UN has undertaken more peace operations than in the previous 44 years combined. As a result, the requirements for sustaining these operations, the number of personnel, and the budgets involved are of vastly greater magnitude.¹⁸ While some improvements have been made to deal with these new demands, the organization still requires substantial improvement.

The case for changing the current UN structure for conducting peace operations must begin by examining the shortfalls of the current system. First, what functions should an organization provide in order to support subordinate commanders conducting peace operations? And second, how effective is the current system in performing these functions?

What functions should an organization provide?

For purposes of comparison, U.S. combatant commands serve as an excellent example of what functions an organization, charged with transforming policy guidance into practical operations, should perform. These commands serve as the critical link between the U.S. National Command Authority (NCA) and the commanders of forces specifically tasked to perform military operations. In the current UN system the Secretary-General and his representatives, as well as the DPKO attempt to perform some of these functions as they constitute the link between the UNSC and the military commander tasked to conduct operations.

Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components," defines the authority delegated to combatant commanders. It establishes objectives and goals including those of: providing strategic direction to armed forces assigned under its authority, conducting coordinated operations with a unity of effort, and integrating land, naval, and sea forces. In addition, the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, makes the combatant commander accountable to the NCA (the policy-makers) for performing their assigned missions.¹⁹ It authorizes the combatant commander to give authoritative direction to all subordinate commands, covering all aspects of military operations and logistics.

No UN command arrangement can be expected to respond in a manner equivalent to a national force operating under its own commanders. National purpose does not exist in a multi-national organization. However any staff operating at a strategic and

operational level must perform some of the same functions as a U.S. command operating at a similar level. More precisely, the staff must attempt to provide clear strategic direction with clearly defined military objectives. It must clearly establish priorities in pursuit of these objectives and be capable of articulating assumptions to facilitate planning for subordinate commanders.²⁰ It must manage information. It must facilitate and coordinate logistical support in an efficient manner. And finally, whether or not it is in the direct chain of command, it must at least be in the chain of communication and capable of providing authoritative direction to force commanders.²¹

1. Strategic Direction

According to Joint PUB 1, "Strategy involves understanding the desired policy goals for a projected operation; that is, what should be the desired state of affairs when the conflict is terminated."²² It includes the art of distributing and applying force in the pursuit of policy goals as well as basic concepts for achieving the desired end state. More simply, strategy is the ends, ways and means that link policy goals to a desired outcome. It is expressed in the form of strategic direction to a force commander. It is important because it defines strategic focus; a fundamental prerequisite for achieving unity of effort.

In the UN, policy goals are expressed as resolutions of the Security Council. However the mechanism for translating these goals into coherent strategy, with defined military objectives, is a central concern. This is an especially complex

issue because the nature of peace operations requires combined operations, usually involving several different nations. Consensus often becomes difficult to achieve, thus, developing an agreeable strategy is difficult but all the more important.

Even in the best of circumstances, nations will act according to their own national interests. Often the words used to express goals and objectives in a resolution will intentionally gloss over national differences in an effort to achieve consensus. Vague mandates attempt to address national goals which are harmonized with an agreed upon strategy. Therefore, nations participating in a coalition ideally must agree to clearly defined and mutually attainable objectives, while remaining consistent with the intent of the mandate.²³ These objectives must be subsequently translated into a strategic direction and provided to the force commander. This direction is the basis for all of his operational planning. It is the critical element needed to realize a fundamental tenet of conducting combined operations, unity of effort.

Unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward commonly recognized objectives. In combined operations, collateral activities may go on simultaneously, united by intent and purpose, if not command. However since unity of command may not be possible due to national command authority prohibitions, the requirement for unity of effort--coordination through cooperation--becomes paramount.²⁴

Since successful combined operations center on achieving unity of effort, each participating nation must agree to provide

the commander of a combined operation sufficient authority to achieve this. The commander and his staff use this authority to synchronize the efforts of forces. This authority is seldom absolute. National contingents normally retain command of their own forces, relinquishing only operational command to the force commander even if his staff is combined.²⁵ Consensus again becomes an essential element for the force commander in order to establish priorities, assign missions, and distribute resources within his command. For this reason a higher headquarters capable of providing strategic direction, based on the objectives and goals of the policy-makers, i.e., (the Security Council rather than diplomatic representatives), becomes a critical link to unifying the effort.

In national forces a strong commander can compensate for the lack of clear direction from a higher headquarters. His authority allows him to achieve unity of command and subsequently effort. However, commanders wielding the type of authority common to national forces will rarely occur during UN peace operations.

2. Managing Information

The staff must be capable of managing information, especially information that comes in the form of intelligence. Most nations operate separate intelligence systems in support of their military forces. These systems vary in size and capability and are not often capable of directly interfacing with those of other nations. Therefore, it is crucial that the staff establish

a system which effectively coordinates the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information within the capabilities of each of the nations participating in the operation.²⁶

The staff must be capable of providing subordinate commander's with basic information critical for conducting some type of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). Examples include: information regarding all military and paramilitary forces in the area; additional threats to friendly forces; and information and analysis of terrain and infrastructure. These are common requirements for military planning.

3. Logistical Support

The staff should be capable of coordinating and facilitating logistical support at the strategic level. It should be capable of providing a basic command and control structure to coordinate these activities in support of theater operations. If needed, it should be capable of coordinating minimal sustainment operations in a responsive manner. Finally it should be capable of managing deployment and redeployment operations at the macro level by providing planning support for movement control and terminal operations. In every circumstance it should compliment and support the logistical activities which are deployed to support national contingents.

4. Chain of Communication

The staff must be a direct and viable link between the force commander and the UNSC. The Security Council establishes

the mandate under which the force commander is operating. There must be a free flow of information as it pertains to the goals and objectives of the mandate and the strategic guidance which is directed towards its pursuit. It is not practical to assume that the Security Council will ever be responsive to immediate requests for direction. As a result, the staff must be capable of providing strategic direction on short notice with the full authority of the Security Council.

How effective is the current system?

According to General Rideau, Deputy Commander on the UN forces in Cambodia, "War is simple, peace operations are difficult." The difficulty stems from several interrelated factors: the political dimension which is at the heart of peace operations at every level from squad on up, the dispersed nature of the force, and the broad perspective leaders require to come up with productive courses of action and right decisions.²⁷ The difficulty becomes immensely more complicated when the collective body mandating the effort lacks the mechanisms for providing force commanders with sufficient strategic direction, information, logistical support, or communications capabilities. Observations concerning recent peace operations will illustrate the point.

1. Strategic direction

As I have already pointed out, strategy involves a clear understanding of desired policy goals. It requires a clear articulation of objectives in terms of what the desired state of

affairs will be upon termination of conflict. The result is reflected in a practical strategic direction provided to a commander. This direction is the basis for all operational planning and is central to the commanders ability to unify efforts. There is no single organization existing in the current UN structure for conducting peace operations which is capable or responsible for providing strategic direction.

Strategic direction requires the identification of a clear and obtainable end state. It must reflect the strategic policy objectives. Defining end state at the force level is extremely difficult. A report prepared in 1994 by the U.S. Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), reflects the common experiences shared by British and French military officers conducting recent peace operations in Bosnia, Somalia, Cambodia, and Yugoslavia. It states that,

. . . it was generally unclear as to how far a commander could or should go to accomplish his mission. UN mandates contain language that is vague or hard to translate into military end-state. Commanders are left to translate UN mandates into useful and understandable mission and end-state.²⁸

In the absence of clearly defined military objectives, a commander is forced to make assumptions through a dialectic process. He must assume the extent of his operational parameters for instance. A headquarters capable of providing him the authoritative direction he requires under these circumstances does not currently exist. As a result, commanders are left to fend for themselves or rely on the discretion of the SRSG, who himself is two levels removed from the body which is responsible

for establishing policy, goals, and objectives; the Security Council.

What is more startling about the CALL report is the fact that the officers who are suggesting that there is no mechanism for receiving clear strategic focus, are from countries which retain permanent membership on the Security Council. This illustrates the current lack of connectivity existing between the policy makers (in a collective sense) and force commanders; something a strategic/operational level headquarters, co-located with the policy makers, would likely improve.

Another CALL report published in 1994 discussed similar issues in Somalia.

In the absence of any effective military headquarters at UN New York, UNOSOM headquarters translated the political objectives outlined in the UN Security Council Resolutions into military objectives and developed the operational campaign plan for the theater.

Yet given 18 subordinate elements to command and control, and the scope of the mission, the report found the staff ill-equipped to effectively deal with the demands placed on it from having to operate at all levels (strategic, operational, and tactical).²⁹

On 9 November 1993, the DPKO conducted an in-house review of current practices in the command and control of peace operations. The review was chaired by the Under Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Mr. Kofi Annan. The participants included a number of senior general officers and civilians from several different countries who were either involved directly in on-going peace operations or assigned senior level staff positions within the DPKO. In the summary working

papers, published for Mr. Annan, it states that the current structure for command and control consists of a four tiered command structure including a: "Grand Strategic Level," "Strategic Level," "Operational Level," and a "Tactical Level."³⁰ The definition of each of these levels is taken directly from the text:

Grand Strategic Level

The applications of multinational resources to achieve policy objectives (mandate). (This is the preserve of the Security Council with the support of the Governments of Member States).

Strategic Level

The application of military, political and other supporting resources to achieve those objectives specified by Grand Strategy. (It will be determined by the Secretary-General and his senior advisors on peace-keeping operations in consultation with contributing Member States).

Operational Level

The direction of military, political, and other supporting resources to achieve the objectives of strategy. (It will be conducted by an in-theater Head of Mission or Force Commander but will be heavily subject to influence or direction from the Grand and/or strategic level authorities

Tactical Level

The disposition of units and supporting agencies for particular tasks which will themselves support operational objectives. (It will be conducted by commanders subordinate to the operational commander).

This structure clearly depicts the current problem. Strategy is being formulated at two different levels between two entirely different branches of the United Nations, the Secretariat and the Security Council. Two organizations which have occasionally demonstrated conflicting philosophical differences especially in terms of defining the roles and

responsibilities of the Secretary-General. Consequently, strategic direction is being determined at the operational/tactical level.

2. Managing Information

Another issue discussed in the same DPKO review concerned intelligence. It stated that, "Intelligence capability is indispensable. Force commanders should determine intelligence requirements and participating governments should provide the information."³¹ This requires a staff to coordinate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of the information. Yet, while the DPKO acknowledges an essential need for intelligence, a 1993 Staff Report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations depicts a UN refusal to provide it. It says that UN missions, "lack, but need, intelligence capabilities. For the same reasons that the UN uses open communication nets, it refuses to develop an intelligence capability, fearing that to do so might compromise local perceptions about the UN's impartiality."³² The irony of this argument is depicted in the next paragraph of the Senate report where an unnamed, "senior civilian UNPROFOR official observed, 'we cannot do preventive diplomacy without information.'"

In the CALL report, British and French officers confirmed the need to assess the military capabilities and potential threats to UN troops posed by local forces.³³ In the situation of UNPROFOR, the Senate Staff Committee reported that, despite a prohibition, UN officers in the field collected what they called

"information" and UN forces throughout the former Yugoslavia produced a weekly "intercommunal conflict map" depicting the status of forces in the area of operations.³⁴

In virtually all peacekeeping operations, the operational commander has been forced to rely on some type of "ad hoc" arrangement in order to collect, analyze, and disseminate vital information to tactical elements. Commanders have usually relied on information supplied to them from separate intelligence systems designed to support national forces. However, communications systems compatibility and the sensitivity of information becomes a barrier for dissemination to other participating forces.

It is unrealistic to assume that any government would willingly supply its most sensitive secrets and intelligence capabilities to an international organization like the UN. It is not unrealistic to expect the UN to be capable of handling and disseminating various types of information it does receive. In the Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, the President recommends developing such an organization. He calls it an, "Information and Research Division, linked to field operations to obtain and provide current information, manage a 24 hour watch center, and monitor open source material and non-sensitive information submitted by governments."³⁵

An organization like the one proposed by the President would never be capable of satisfying all the intelligence requirements of force commanders. But it would markedly improve

what currently exists--essentially nothing. It would certainly help correct the problem of dissemination. Currently there is a limited amount of information sharing between UN Headquarters in New York and the field.³⁶ Even when various nation's intelligence agencies contribute information to the UN, there is no way to disseminate it to operational field commanders.

3. Logistical Support

According to the "Peacekeeper's Handbook," "The effective functioning of a Peacekeeping Force depends on an administrative apparatus which can integrate and reconcile its different and varied needs into a coherent whole, thereby ensuring a smooth operating logistics operation."³⁷ Yet recent UN operations indicate that the current system is not effective in this capacity.

There is no UN standard operating procedure for combined logistics.³⁸ The UN relies on national support for national contingents. This becomes a problem in that many of the forces participating in current operations have limited logistical capabilities. For instance, a force contingent from Nepal arrived for UN duty in Bosnia with weapons, uniforms, and a bag of money. The same thing happened with a contingent from Ghana in Rwanda (except they did not have the money). Of the 28 nations which contributed forces during UNOSOM II, very few relied on national support, in fact virtually every contingent relied on the UN for virtually all classes of supply.³⁹

In Somalia, "ad hoc" relationships had to be formed in order to coordinate common logistical support needs. There was no direction provided by the UN to facilitate basic planning priorities, such as establishing Main Supply Routes (MSR) or berthing at the Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD). There currently is no standardized logistics reporting system. There is not even a standardized measurement system. There was no instruction given to newly assigned UN personnel on the UN logistics procurement system, methods of requesting supplies and equipment, or accountability procedures. As a result it took as long as 2-3 months for the staff to become knowledgeable and proficient.⁴⁰

The problem in Somalia, as with all UN peace operations, was that all logistics planning and coordination was done on an "ad hoc" basis. It cannot develop to any degree until the operation has been authorized by a resolution in the Security Council or funded by the General Assembly. Hence, there is very little forward thinking done in this critical area. This creates problems for participating forces in the early days of any operation until a new logistics organization has been set up and is operational.⁴¹ This is especially true for participants with limited logistical capabilities.

According to Major General Romeo D'Allaire, Force commander for the UN operations in Rwanda, "Ad Hockery is good if your at steady state, or a plateau with SOPs and doctrine, etc. . . It is not a good methodology for cranking up a mission or responding to a crisis." The UN logistics system is at best a system structured for garrison type responsibilities (or

established situations such as Cyprus). It is not structured for leaping into new missions at a rapid pace. It is not structured for crises.⁴²

The Clinton administration has suggested that the UN develop and field a computer system which is capable of linking the logistics planners in the Secretariat to the logistics offices of participating member nations; a capability which does not currently exist.⁴³ This could potentially facilitate a unity of effort for logistics planning. However, this effort would do little toward providing the full range of logistical supporting activities which are required to efficiently and consistently provide support to forces conducting UN peace operations.

4. Chain of Communication

"The UN Headquarters currently lacks the capability to be in constant and direct communication with all its units in the field."⁴⁴ As a result there is no direct and viable link between the force commander and the UNSC. (Direct meaning without interference from intermediate levels within the Secretariat like the SGSR, the DPKO, or the Secretary-General.) Moreover, given the multistrategic levels of the current system, there is no mechanism to provide timely strategic guidance to a force commander. A headquarters capable of providing strategic direction with the full authority of the Security Council would alleviate this problem. Currently, any decision which a force commander cannot make on his own is referred to the Security

Council through the SRSG, DPKO, and the Secretary-General. There it is mired in political debate.

There is no immediate organization to pass guidance down or information u⁴⁵ The DPKO in-house review recognized this deficiency. In a summary of major points it stated that, "There should be a clear and uninterrupted chain of command between the UN HQ and the FC. Special envoys should not intervene in this chain."⁴⁶ (The summary went on to recognize that this may not be acceptable to the current headquarters.) Nevertheless, efforts must be made to ensure a connectivity between the policy makers and the operators.

A direct link to the Security Council is also critical for a force commander faced with a crisis. An example of this type of crisis occurred in Bosnia when three Canadian soldiers were taken hostage. MG MacKenzie immediately needed to contact the UN Headquarters to request intervention by the Bosnian Ambassador to the UN. According to General Mackenzie, "Don't phone the UN after 5:00 or on a weekend, there's no one there to answer the phone." After a series of calls around New York he finally contacted a top official in the DPKO at his home. The General told the DPKO official his name. The man responded with a series of questions. Which mission are you with? What country is that in? Where are you? What do you do? The General hung up the phone.

Efforts have been made within the DPKO to improve the flow of information between Force Commanders and the UN. Nevertheless, the ability to leverage situations (like a hostage

incident) rests with the Security Council. A Force Commander needs to have access.

The Evolution of the Current System

U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering, in an address to the Institute for National Strategic Studies in 1993, described peacekeeping as a "role evolved under the United Nations completely outside the language of the charter, but completely inside the spirit and purpose of the charter."⁴⁷ The same can be said of all peace operations which, with the exception of coalition arrangements like in Korea and Kuwait, function under the same UN command and control system (described in chal) as traditional peacekeeping operations. Operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia are recent examples of this. The language and intent of the charter describe something entirely different.

The experience of World War II had a profound effect on the diplomats who drafted the UN Charter in 1945. At that time a victorious alliance was beginning to celebrate the downfall of the Axis Powers. The experience reinforced the concept that a coalition, comprised of the world's major military powers, could impose its will on a would-be aggressor. It became important to preserve the alliance in a form which could continue to impose its will long after the war's end. The Permanent Members of the Security Council were selected primarily on the basis of their contributions to the war effort. This group had proven capable of general unity by their efforts to stop Axis Power aggression. Logically, the leaders felt they could apply that relationship to

a new collective security arrangement called the United Nations. In a message sent from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Marshal Joseph Stalin congratulating him on the 27th anniversary of the Red Army on 23 February 23 1945, Roosevelt praises the efforts of, "the Red Army together with the all-out effort of the United Nations forces in the south and in the west assure the speedy attainment of our common goal."⁴⁸ What is significant about this message is term "United Nations." Although the term had been used for some time to define the alliance, it is interesting that the term would later define the "United Nations," a follow-on collective security arrangement from WWII. Certainly some of the relationships which defined the United Nations forces fighting WWII would later provide the basis for relationships in the UN; especially in terms of applying force towards aggressors.

Despite initial concerns about the procedures within the Security Council, particularly voting, there was a general agreement on the organization's goals and principles reflected in the charter.⁴⁹ The first sentence in Chapter I describes collective goals for maintaining international peace. Chapter VI, *Pacific Settlement of Disputes*, and Chapter VII, *Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression*, articulate a concept for a measured application of United Nations forces in pursuit of these goals and principles. These chapters demonstrate a common view among the permanent members of the Security Council that the application of armed forces was a logical extension of policy. A generally "Clausewitean" method toward imposing peace throughout the world.

Writing in 1827, Clausewitz described war as, "nothing but the continuation of policy with other means."⁵⁰ Strategy, is the art of distributing and applying force in the pursuit of policy. Efforts designed to impose one's will upon his adversary. With the maintenance of international peace and security as a policy objective, Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter generally support this policy continuum.

The following articles are highlights of Chapter VI:

Article 33.(1);

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

Article 34;

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 36.(1);

The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

finally, Article 37.(2);

If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Most all UN peace operations have been mandated under the terms of this chapter. Peacekeeping in its purist form can only

be realized under this chapter as the title, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," implies. It begins with emphasis on negotiations and mediation in Article 33 and progresses to more compelling measures determined by the Security Council in Article 37. More robust measures are reflected in the following chapter.

Chapter VII progresses along the policy continuum with an escalation to overt military measures as follows:

Article 39;

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 41;

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42;

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

This chapter begins with economic and diplomatic sanctions in Article 41. After exhausting those possibilities it resorts to overt military measures by UN forces by air, sea, and land as necessary in Article 42.

Chapter VII, Articles 46 and 47, lie at the center of this thesis. They concern provisions for providing "strategic

direction" and "plans for the application of armed forces" for the Security Council. They describe the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46:

Plans for the application of armed forces shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47:

(1) There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

(2) The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of the Member in its work.

(3) The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

(4) The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

Clearly these articles contain the prescription for translating UNSC policy objectives into military strategy; the responsibility for providing strategic direction to UN forces, and the implied responsibility for determining suitable command relationships for forces placed at the disposal of the UNSC. Why then, did the United Nations adopt a structure for conducting peace operations which repudiates the intent of the charter?

The Cold War

Donald F. McHenry, US ambassador to the UN during the Carter administration says, "The Cold War was probably the major impediment to a realization of the UN as people thought about it in 1944-1945."⁵¹ Indeed a careful inspection of previously classified US National Security Council (NSC) documents detail one of the problems.

In September 1950, the Security Council was in a virtual stalemate as a result of tensions and disagreements between the US and the USSR. Consequently the NSC was considering a proposal to the General Assembly, which was due to convene on the 19th, for a "Program of United Nations Action to Stop Aggression" (NSC 85). Part A of the program is summarized as follows:

If the Security Council because of the veto fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the General Assembly should adjust its procedures so as to be convened within twenty-four hours. The General Assembly could recommend that the members take action against aggression, including the use of armed forces.⁵²

In the report, the Secretary of State expressed a concern that the UN was on the verge of ineptitude and badly needed revitalization, especially in the face of communist threats like Korea. He noted that the psychological time to act was immediately as the USSR had just completed six weeks of, "maneuverings which have been calculated to render, and have rendered the UN Security Council impotent." He felt the US, "must prepare for expeditious United Nations action in an organ

of the United Nations which cannot be obstructed by the Soviet veto--the General Assembly."

The Secretary of Defense, speaking of behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), dissented. The JCS believed that adoption of the resolution would, "highlight the present incapacity of the United Nations to deal successfully with the pattern of USSR and USSR inspired aggression which now threatens the peace of the world."⁵³ They also feared the U.S. would be morally obligated to consistently place forces at the hands of the General Assembly as a result of sponsoring such a resolution.

The JCS felt NSC 85 represented a direct risk to national security. It could potentially piecemeal U.S. forces throughout the world. It could also involve the U.S. in a direct war with the USSR. The bottom line was that the JCS could not concur with any plan which would impel the U.S. to commit its armed forces without preserving a JCS statutory right as "principal military advisors."

Nevertheless, NCS 85 was adopted as US Governmental policy on 16 September, 1950. It was subsequently proposed to the General Assembly and adopted with minor modifications in committee. The important aspects of NSC 85 as it relates to this thesis are:

1. The fact that in 1950 the Security Council was "rendered impotent".

2. That in 1950 the US Government was actively seeking another organ of the UN to pursue its national interests of containing communism.

The final resolution adopted by the General Assembly established a Peace Observation Commission charged with monitoring peace and reporting potential conflicts to the General Assembly. Comprised of representatives from 14 countries, the staff and facilities were provided by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General was also requested to provide a panel of military experts available for Member States. They were to provide military advice to forces preparing to conduct UN military operations. Finally, the Secretary-General was asked to provide staff and facilities for a Collective Measures Committee to consider collective self-defense and regional arrangements.

The Secretary-General was becoming increasingly involved in the "management" of collective security operations. At first the commissions were relatively uncontroversial and mostly required his attention as an administrator and a diplomat. However in 1956, after discussions over the Suez Canal broke down, the Secretary-General became inextricably involved in peacekeeping. Under a Canadian proposal to set up a peacekeeping force for deployment to Egypt, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold assembled a force and conducted the negotiations with Egypt for agreement on their employment. Although he was directed to consult with a committee established to provide him guidance in this affair, the committee did little more than give the membership an illusory feeling that the Secretary-General was being kept under control.⁵⁴

From this time forward, "leave it to Dag" became a standard operating procedure for peace operations in the UN.

Operations which included military observer missions, peacekeeping missions, and finally peace enforcement operations in the Congo in 1960. Aside from the creation of some administrative agencies in the Secretariat designed to assist with management, little has changed. That is, by custom, the responsibility for managing peace operations remains with the Secretary-General.

The consequences of this long term practice are significant in terms of my thesis. Indeed, one of the major obstacles preventing a structural change in how the UN conducts peace operations is the customary entrenchment of the existing system. "Leave it to Dag" got the Secretariat stuck (perhaps inexorably) in conducting peace operations. It has become a convention; a way of life for many people employed within the Secretariat. As a result, it will take a very devoted effort on behalf of the Security Council and perhaps the General Assembly to really change the existing system. Nevertheless, it can and should be done.

CHAPTER 4

POTENTIAL FOR MSC

"If the published records are to be believed, the MSC has done no substantive work since 1948."⁵⁵ However, according to Ambassador Pickering, the time may have come for revisiting the organization and developing several uses for it in the context of peace operations. "These could involve the evolution of NATO experience in communications, logistics, the inter-operation of forces, and the resolution of language and other problems which could plague a coalition force that was not well prepared."⁵⁶ Chapter 3 briefly discussed the intended functions of the Military Staff Committee in terms of the UN Charter. This chapter will explore what the MSC has done to date and what potential exists for enhancing the conduct of UN peace operations by expanding its role.

What The MSC Has Done

The first Security Council resolution was adopted on 25 January 1946. It instructed the MSC to meet in London on 1 February to begin its work. The MSC missed its first deadline and was not established until the 4th, however, it was able to quickly draft a statute and rules of procedure. On 14 February the chairmen of the committee sent the drafts to the Security

Council, also meeting in London, and adjourned pending the move to New York.⁵⁷

On February 16th, the Security Council made three decisions regarding the work of the MSC. 1) It instructed the Committee of Experts on the Rules of Procedure to review the two drafts sent from the MSC. 2) As an interim measure (pending approval by the Experts Committee) the UNSC authorized the MSC to proceed on its own proposals for procedures. 3) It directed the MSC to examine, in detail, the military provisions of Article 43 of the UN Charter.⁵⁸

Article 43:

(1) All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

(2) Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

(3) The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and the Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Upon completion of the move, the MSC met at a hotel in New York on 25 March 1946 to resume its work. It organized a subcommittee to deliberate the basic principles for the organization of United Nations forces. The subcommittee had its first meeting on 28 March. The participants resolved to submit a statement of principles, governing the organization of UN forces,

by 3 April. The United States, Britain, France, and China met the deadline. The Soviet Union did not respond.⁵⁹

In a second attempt, the four cooperating members suggested the establishment of a second subcommittee. It was organized on 5 June to study and propose a special agreement between the United Nations and Member States concerning the provision of forces. However, the work of this subcommittee ultimately fizzled out. The result of interference from both the Secretary-General and the Committee of Experts responding to the two initial drafts sent to the UNSC the previous February. Although the subcommittee produced nothing, the procedural issues were ultimately resolved and revised texts were published by the MSC on 1 August.⁶⁰

On 13 February 1947, the Security Council renewed its request for response pursuant to its previous resolution. Again it directed the MSC to examine in detail the military provisions of Article 43 of the UN Charter. Primarily, and as a first step, it was to report on the basic principles governing the organization of UN armed forces. The MSC issued its response on 30 April 1947. It consisted of forty-one draft articles. Some with alternative texts to account for disagreements within the Committee.⁶¹

The Security Council adopted twenty-five of the forty-one articles on a provisional basis. Most were adopted unanimously with only a few abstentions. However, the remaining articles, concerning the most critical questions, could not be adopted.

There was simply no way to reconcile the disagreements. In his book, Evan Laurd offers some of the major points of disagreement:

1. The Soviet Union wanted forces stationed only on the territory of those countries which provided them and objected to the use of foreign bases (fearing the imposition of outside capitalist influences in the communist sphere). Most all of the other participants thought bases should be made available for the permanent stationing of forces.

2. The Soviet Union wanted a smaller force consisting of not more than twelve divisions and 600 bombers; the US wanted a large force of twenty divisions, three battleships, and 15 cruisers.

3. The Soviet Union wanted an assurance that forces used by the UN would be withdrawn within 90 days of the termination of any operation (fearing long term outside exposure to capitalist influences); the other participants wanted greater latitude on this question.

4. The Soviet Union thought that equal forces should be provided by each of the permanent members while the United States wanted a variable contribution to be possible.

The MSC, at the request of the Security Council continued to attempt reconciliation over the following year. On 2 July 1948, the Committee informed the Security Council that it was hopelessly deadlocked.⁶² Since then, the Military Staff Committee has done little besides agree to meet over the last 47 years. Meanwhile, a new mechanism for applying forces in pursuit of UNSC

mandates was developing outside the Security Council; under the Secretary-General and within the Secretariat.

Potential -- The NATO / Warsaw Pact Model

In his book, Political Leadership in NATO, Robert Jordan writes,

In many respects NATO reflects the United Nations that it supplanted as the instrument of European security. The North Atlantic Council, composed of the permanent representatives from the member governments, is the body's highest organ; the Military Committee and the Command Groups correspond to an expanded and effective implementation of the United Nation's abortive Military Staff Committee and international forces; and the International Staff/Secretariat carries out functions similar in many ways (but quite dissimilar in others) to those of the United Nation's Secretariat.⁶³

Given the end of the Cold War and the diplomatic reapproachment of the US and Russia, new possibilities exist for revitalizing the "abortive" MSC. The joint/combined experience of its members, and their experience in coalition operations in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, suggest a tremendous potential exists for enhancing peace operations. As I have already expressed, the very nature of peace operations requires combined operations. In addition, they often require the integration of several types of forces, to include naval and air (especially in terms of logistics), and characterize joint operations.

Some have suggested the MSC could assume many of the functions and responsibilities of the NATO Military Committee (MC). (See figure 4-1.) The MC is the highest military authority in the NATO Alliance. It is responsible for the overall conduct of military affairs, yet, it is not in the chain of command. The alliance recognizes that command by committee is

not practicable. Nevertheless, the MC is responsible for all of the Major NATO Commands (MNC) in Europe, the Atlantic, the Channel, and the Canada-US Regional Planning Group. Likewise, all MNCs are responsible to the MC.⁶⁴

NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE




Figure 4-1

The MC is under the political direction of the North Atlantic Committee (NAC), the supreme authority of NATO, and the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), a subsidiary organ of the NAC. The MC acts as an interface between the political and military bodies in NATO and provides military advice up to the DPC and Council and down to the MNCs.⁶⁵ While the NAC coordinates the security policies of member nations in accordance with the goals of the Alliance, the MC: formulates joint defense plans in support of alliance goals, establishes the infrastructure for forces to conduct operations, and ensures uniformity in training. It performs these functions in peacetime, crisis, or war.

The MC is composed of the Chiefs of Staff of all member nations, except France and Iceland. (France is not a member since it withdrew from the integrated military structure of the Alliance in 1966. Iceland has no military forces but can be represented by a civilian.) The Chiefs of Staff meet three times a year or whenever is necessary. However, each Chief of Staff appoints a Permanent Military Representative with effective decision making powers. This allows the MC to operate on a continuous basis with Permanent Representatives staying in close contact with their respective Chiefs of Staff. In the case of the US, the Permrep reports directly to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Chiefs of Staff elect a Chairmen of the Military Committee who presides over the organization for a period of three years. He directs the day to day business of the Committee and acts as its spokesman. He attends Summits, meetings of the NAC, and meetings of the DPC to provide military advise on behalf of the MC.

The MC is assisted in its work by an International Military Staff (IMS). It is directed by a three star ranked officer from one of the member nations. He in turn oversees the work of the IMS which consists of approximately 500 personnel divided into six divisions. The functions of some of these divisions are briefly discussed below. They consist of a Plans and Policy Division, Operations Division, Intelligence Division, Logistics and Resources Division, Communications and Information Systems Division, and Armaments and Standardization Division.

The Policy and Plans division is responsible for all military policy and planning matters for the MC. It is responsive to both higher and subordinate levels. It develops and interprets the collective views of the MC and MNCs on military policy matters for the NAC and DPC. It also develops policies and plans to support NAC and DPC initiatives.

The Operations Division consists of various branches dealing with current operations, force posture, force structure, crisis management, and exercises and training.

Intelligence in NATO is contributed by national intelligence agencies through the Intelligence Division. This division performs several key functions. It keeps the MC, NAC, and DPC informed on any direct or indirect threats it assesses against the Alliance and provides intelligence input into NATO documents. It provides intelligence in response to policy questions. Finally, it coordinates and facilitates the production and dissemination of certain types of basic intelligence documents to subordinate commands.

NATO recognizes the need to protect both its information and its sources. It has adopted classification procedures for safeguarding intelligence similar to those found in the United States. As a result, national intelligence agencies can contribute information to NATO with confidence.

The Logistics and Resources Division, "deals with the international military management of allied logistics, financial, manpower, and infrastructure matters."⁶⁶ The Division is divided into logistics, resources, and manpower branches. These branches

are designed to facilitate and coordinate, at the macro level, the logistics requirements of the subordinate commands.

The Communications and Information Systems Division ensures the connectivity of NATO. It establishes communication policy, identifies requirements, ensures interoperability, and provides oversight to various communications support agencies. Most importantly, it establishes the overall communications infrastructure for NATO from strategic to tactical levels.

According to the NATO Handbook, "The forces of NATO countries remain, as a rule, under national authority." For this reason, multilateral coordination at the strategic level (NAC through the MC to the MNCs) is the primary mechanism for achieving unity of effort. By most accounts, NATO has been successful at achieving unity of effort since its inception in 1949. Through deterrence and crisis planning it has responded to a number of threats over the years ranging from the Berlin crisis in 1961, to the fall of Czechoslovakia in 1968, through the threat of Soviet intervention in Poland in 1980, to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Moreover, the long-term coalition experience of NATO is a common denominator among three of the five permanent members of the UNSC.

The Warsaw Pact provided a similar long term coalition experience for the Russian Armed Forces. The political and diplomatic processes (in the Political Consultative Committee (PCC)) were considered by most to have been extensions of Soviet policy.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, the Combined Command of the Combined Armed Forces (CAF) provided Soviet officers a joint/combined

coalition experience in formulating defense plans in accordance with PCC goals, establishing force infrastructure to accomplish those goals, and establishing uniformity in training.⁶⁸

MC²

By virtue of their size alone, the permanent members of the Security Council retain a rich experience in joint/combined operations within their respective militaries. Four of the five have experience in long term military coalitions. This has provided them with substantial experience concerning the nuances of conducting coalition operations. One can therefore reasonably assume that among them, there exists the capability for performing basic strategic/operational level staff functions such as; providing strategic direction, managing information, coordinating logistical support, and facilitating the communications link between policy makers and the forces.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This investigation was designed to concentrate on two issues:

1. Shortcomings within the current UN organization for military command and control which adversely effects guidance and planning support for peace operations?

2. Structural changes designed to make the system more effective? Specifically, empowering the Military Staff Committee to realize its responsibilities outlined in the UN Charter while relieving the Secretariat and the Secretary-General from performing duties for which it is neither designed for, nor capable of.

This chapter will begin by attempting to answer these two questions.

Planning Support and Guidance

Chapter 3 defined what functions should be expected of an organization charged with transforming policy guidance into practical operations. We defined these into four broad functions: strategic direction, managing information, logistical support, and chain of communication, which are essential in order to effectively provide guidance and planning support to force commanders.

Strategic direction, information, and logistical coordination are imperatives for operational and tactical planning. Operational and tactical guidance requires a direct, viable and responsive link connecting the tactical commander, through the operational commander, to the policy makers.

So does the current UN organization provide effective guidance and planning support? The answer is simply NO. The current organization does not. Recent UN experiences in Bosnia, Somalia, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda report as much.

There is no single organization existing in the current UN structure capable or responsible for providing strategic direction to force commanders. Currently, the Security Council provides mandates, the Secretary-General assembles resources, and commanders are left to determine strategic direction through a dialectic process.

There is no organization in the current structure capable of managing essential information. There is no coordination for collection, no analysis, and no dissemination capability. Despite a recognized need for this service, there is little possibility of obtaining it. Concerns for impartiality have overridden the necessity to provide it to the forces.

There is no effective logistical planning support built into the current system. The system relies primarily on national support for national forces. Yet there is no coordination effort at the strategic level. Forces with limited logistical capability often find it difficult to operate until an ad hoc logistical organization is developed in theater. Everything is

done on a situational basis, usually at the operational level. (Except for some long-standing UN operations where permanent arrangements have been developed.) There is no standardization, no reporting system, and no mechanism for eliminating duplication. As a result, the current UN organization is not capable of providing the forward thinking required to effectively manage complex multilateral operations.

There is no direct, viable, and responsive link between the policy makers and operational commanders. There is no organized system to provide timely authoritative direction on behalf of the policy makers in response to operational level requests for guidance. Moreover, the UN does not possess the means to communicate guidance to all of its commanders.

Would The MSC Be More Effective?

The question of whether an empowered MSC would enhance the UN's capability for conducting peace operations lies at the center of this thesis. Two antithetic arguments can help resolve the issue. 1) Changing the system would diminish the Secretary-General's ability to leverage international disputes throughout the world. 2) If reverting to the MSC was an attractive alternative, why hasn't it already happened? An excerpt from a report written by the Secretary-General and an examination of a recent UN peace enforcement operation will provide a context for answering these two questions.

Report by the Secretary-General

In An Agenda For Peace, Boutros Boutros-Ghali reiterates the need for the Security Council to implement the terms of Article 43 whereby Member States undertake to make available armed forces, assistance and facilities to the Security Council for implementation of its mandates. He acknowledges the Military Staff Committee's responsibility in this endeavor. However, he does not envision the utilization of Article 43 forces for peacekeeping duty (Chapter VI operations). "It is my view that the Military Staff Committee should be seen in the context of Chapter VII, and not that of planning or conduct of peacekeeping operations."⁶⁹ He prescribes the utilization of Article 43 forces be restricted to, "outright aggression, imminent or actual."

For cases where a cease fire has not been complied with, Boutros-Ghali recommends the creation and employment of another type of force, "Peace-Enforcement Units". Composed of "more heavily armed" peacekeeping forces, these units should be placed, "under the command of the Secretary-General". He implies that having forces of this nature at his disposal effects his ability to leverage peace as a third party to a dispute.

The distinction between Article 43 forces (for Chapter VII operations) and Peace-Enforcement Units is not altogether clear. The operative difference appears to be the existence of an unrecognized cease-fire; normally a pre-existing circumstance for Chapter VII operations.

United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)

In April of 1994, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) prepared a Briefing Report for Senator Robert Dole. The report concerned the effectiveness of UN operations in Bosnia. The report cited, "weaknesses in overall UN leadership and coordination." It singled out the lack of an integrated plan, and weaknesses in command and control as major contributing factors for the shortfalls experienced in the operation.

Lack of an Integrated Plan

In November 1991 the Secretary-General designated the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the lead agency to conduct humanitarian operations in Bosnia. Between January and February of 1992, Croatia and Serbia agreed to an unconditional cease-fire. The Security Council established UNPROFOR to implement the terms of the cease-fire. Later its mandate was expanded to impose and secure UN designated "safe zones" in Bosnia while continuing to provide security for UNHCR operations. (All of this occurring in an active war zone.) Yet there was no overall plan to link military and humanitarian actions into common strategic objectives. In fact UNHCR commented that they never intended to integrate humanitarian and military operations. To do so would imply force should be used to deliver aid, thus compromising the humanitarian nature of their mission.⁷⁰

This situation underlines the problem of having strategy determined by two separate branches of the UN. The Charter

clearly empowers the Security Council as the body responsible for conducting both chapter VI and VII operations. In this instance, unity of effort was doomed from the beginning.

Weaknesses in Command and Control

"Command and control problem's weakened UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its mandate."⁷¹ Confusion over the mandate and the lack of any headquarters capable of providing authoritative direction on behalf of the Security Council were contributing factors. The reality is that most national contingents do not recognize the Secretary-General as a "commander-in-chief"--and he isn't. Contingent commanders often turn to their national authorities for guidance and clarification on what they are mandated to do. Governments turn to the Security Council and not the Secretary-General for mandate clarification--and they should. In one example,

A troop contingent was ordered to redeploy to Mostar, where intense fighting between Bosnian Muslims and Croats was causing widespread suffering among the civilian population. When we visited the contingent several months later, it still had not redeployed. An officer of the contingent told us that each national contingent had discretion in carrying out day-to-day operations. Moreover, the command to redeploy to Mostar exceeded UNPROFOR's mandate.

Security Council resolutions, however, mandated UNPROFOR to provide security for humanitarian assistance, and UNHCR and private voluntary organizations were operating in Mostar. UNPROFOR elevated the dispute to the United Nations. According to UN officials, the Security Council, in an exchange of letters with the contingent's government, made clear that UNPROFOR's mandate did extend to such actions as the order to redeploy.⁷²

The GAO report identifies similar problems with UN command and control concerning operations in Cambodia and Somalia. The report acknowledges that, "central control and direction for

operations is essential to execute a mission." As we have determined, unity of command for multilateral operations is difficult to achieve. Thus, unity and coordination of effort and become paramount for mission success. The current system has demonstrated, during UNPROFOR and several other missions, that it is not capable of facilitating this endeavor. Unity of effort must begin at the to It must begin with the Security Council.

Results

1) The validity of the argument that, the Secretary-General's ability to leverage disputes is weakened by changing the system, is flawed. First, it fails to recognize the primacy of the Security Council for conducting operations under both Chapter VI and VII of the Charter. Second, it presumes that his ability to leverage force is enhanced by controlling peace operations.

The experiences of UNPROFOR demonstrate that bi-cameral strategy does not promote unity of effort. The vague differences between Article 43 forces and Peace Enforcement Units are inconsequential for forces threatening, or threatened by deadly force. The Secretary-General cannot be strengthened by forces which are not suitably employed. Moreover, proper force employment by the Security Council, with the assistance of the MSC, could possibly enhance peacemaking prospects. An inherent strength of the Secretary-General is derived from the perception that he has no traditional vested interests. Adversarial parties

engaged in a conflict, to include the UN, would be more inclined to view him as an impartial negotiator.⁷³

2) Peace operations conducted under the Secretary-General are based on a customary practice that grew out of the Cold War. The organizational structure which has been established to support them has taken time and effort to build. Despite a lack of effectiveness, there is a great deal of hesitation to change. Consensus must first be built among Member Nations. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War and the resurgence of the Security Council as an institution capable of implementing the intent of the Charter should invite renewed interest in the MSC as an effective mechanism for enhancing peace operations.

Conclusion

The Security Council maintains "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." It is only logical that an empowered MSC, could capably execute its policy decisions in an efficient manner perhaps similar to the NATO Military Committee. Moreover, one has to question whether senior general officers seasoned in complex multilateral operations might be better suited for applying UN forces than the (utopian-minded) political bureaucrats of the Secretariat.

Current discussion in the Congress of the United States surrounds effectively eliminating support for continued peace operations. The United States contributes as much as 33% of the financing for these operations. Much of the discussion is based on the poor return that the U.S. receives for its investment. To

this end the Military Staff Committee may provide a compromise. The direct influence resulting from our participation, and the participation of our NATO allies (and other major powers) may provide a more focused effort for conducting peace operations consistent with U.S. national security objectives. It may be critical for preserving the United Nations ability to conduct future peace operations.

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